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Abstract: The publication of the official report into the 1994 Loughinisland 
massacre, when loyalist gunmen shot dead six people in a small, rural bar, 
provides an opportunity to examine the nature of institutionalised collusion, 
the state practices it involved and the sectarianized social order which made it 
possible during the conflict in Northern Ireland. Building on an earlier analysis 
of the colonial and counterinsurgency roots of collusion (Race and Class, 57:2) 
this article provides a commentary on the findings of the Loughinisland report 
and explores two issues. The first concerns new evidence (directly 
contradicting earlier official inquiries) of state collusion in the importation of 
arms used by loyalists to escalate their campaign of assassination in this 
period. Second, the extent to which collusive practices facilitated the actions of 
loyalist paramilitaries and confounded the investigation of the mass killings at 
Loughinisland as elsewhere. In terms of both (it will be argued) there is a need 
to place an understanding of collusion in the wider context of a social order 
shaped by long-term sectarianized social divisions and violence, embedded in 
localised power structures, that framed the very institutions and agencies of 
the state, not least the police and other state forces.  
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Introduction 
In June this year the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (Dr Michael 
Maguire) published a report into the shooting dead of six people in the 
Height’s Bar, Loughinisland, Co. Down in 1994; one of the worst atrocities of 
the three decades of conflict in the North of Ireland.i  At the time the killings 
drew widespread national and international attention and condemnation. It 
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appeared to be yet another nakedly sectarian attack carried out solely by 
loyalist paramilitaries. Certainly loyalists were responsible, but only latterly did 
allegations gather pace that collusion between members of state security 
forces and loyalist paramilitaries had played a crucial part in the massacre. In a 
devastating, watershed report, overturning the whitewash of an earlier wholly 
discredited investigation, Dr Maguire declared he has ‘no hesitation in 
unambiguously determining that collusion is a significant feature of the 
Loughinisland murders’.ii Collusion on the part of the police force, the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), was here understood in both an active sense (‘to 
conspire, connive or collaborate’) and in the failure to act (by ‘turning a blind 
eye’ or ‘pretended ignorance’ of what should ‘morally, legally or officially’ be 
opposed).iii It included ‘wilful acts’ to protect informers, ‘catastrophic’ 
investigative failures and ‘the destruction of records’.iv Pivotal, insisted Dr 
Maguire, was the role of a ‘”hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil” approach 
to the use of informants’ by RUC Special Branch; something also evident in the 
actions of British military intelligence units.v There have been many reports 
into conflict-related killings in Northern Ireland, but few as important and 
‘likely to challenge previous official narratives of the nature of the conflict’ as 
that into the attack at Loughinisland.vi It therefore offers an opportunity to 
consider more broadly the nature of institutionalised collusion, the state 
practices it involved and the sectarianized social order which made it possible. 
 
The Loughinisland Massacre 
Just after 10pm on 18 June 1994 two masked, armed gunmen belonging to the 
loyalist paramilitary group the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) entered the 
Heights Bar, known locally as O’Toole’s.vii The tiny, rural pub was packed with 
locals, their eyes glued to the television watching what proved to be the 
Republic of Ireland’s historic win over Italy in the opening game of the football 
world cup at the Giant’s Stadium in New Jersey. Given its location the gunmen 
could be assured most, if not all, of those inside would be Catholics. The 
attackers opened fire, one with an automatic rifle, shooting dead six men and 
seriously injuring five others, leaving behind a scene of utter carnage. ‘There 
were bodies piled on top of each other’, one eyewitness recounted, ‘It was like 
a dream; a nightmare’.viii Those killed, mostly middle-aged family men (the 
youngest, father-of-two Adrian Rogan was 34, the eldest Barney Green was 87) 
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were all from in and around Loughinisland, a village that had seen little enough 
of the ‘Troubles’.ix None had any political or paramilitary connections. The 
Loughinisland massacre was one of a wave of loyalist bar attacks and mass 
killings that rose, paradoxically, as the IRA move toward a ceasefire declared 
just two months later, and Northern Ireland embarked upon the peace process 
that would ultimately see an end to 30 years of conflict.x For the first time in 
decades the year leading up to the Loughinisland attack had seen loyalists kill 
more people than anyone else, including the IRA.xi In no small part that was 
because loyalists had been substantially re-armed in the late 1980s, where the 
story behind collusion in the Loughinisland killings begins. 
 
Arming Loyalism 
The automatic rifle used to such lethal effect at Loughinisland was part of a 
large illegal shipment smuggled into the North by loyalists from South Africa in 
late 1987.xii There have been long term, hotly disputed allegations of collusion 
and the involvement of British military intelligence in bringing in this massive 
weapons haul, linked primarily to the activities of Brian Nelson.xiii In 1987 
Nelson was Chief of Intelligence throughout the North for the loyalist 
paramilitary group the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), responsible for 
collating and disseminating intelligence used in launching loyalist attacks.xiv He 
was also, at one and the same time, a British army agent run by the Force 
Research Unit (FRU), the covert British military unit responsible for agent 
handling in the North. Indeed Nelson had only recently been re-recruited by 
the FRU specifically to take up this lead role within the UDA.xv During this 
period at least 85% of all intelligence used by loyalists in their violent campaign 
originated from state files and Nelson acted as an important conduit for such 
state intelligence and targeting information.xvi In 1985, with the full knowledge 
and support of his army handlers, Nelson had travelled to South Africa at the 
behest of the head of the UDA to arrange an arms shipment via a contact 
(originally from Northern Ireland) working for the Apartheid regime’s state 
weapons company Armscor.xvii While this failed to transpire, because of a lack 
of loyalist funds, the links developed by Nelson would be the same as those 
that facilitated the 1987 shipment.  
Despite this, in his 2012 report on the 1989 killing of human rights 
lawyer Pat Finucane, Desmond de Silva QC concluded the arms shipment was a 
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‘separate operation with which Nelson and the FRU had no involvement’.xviii 
Indeed, despite his key intelligence role within the UDA de Silva accepted 
Nelson’s contention he (and by implication, his handlers) did not know the 
origin of the imported arms until several months later. De Silva also reserved 
special praise for the efforts made by the security forces in arms seizures of 
loyalist weapons, including those of a portion of the 1987 shipment made in 
January and February 1988.xix For de Silva the RUC record of seizing weapons 
was clear evidence to refute as ‘untenable’ arguments that loyalist ‘terrorists’ 
were ‘simply State-sponsored forces’. Despite finding ample evidence of 
collusion elsewhere, the picture drawn here was that British intelligence and 
state forces had neither helped, nor being aware of, this massive shipment of 
arms beforehand, and did all it could to seize the weapons and stop their use 
in loyalist attacks afterward.  
The findings of the Loughinisland report stand in stark contrast to such 
conclusions, painting a very different portrait of the foreknowledge of state 
agencies and the role of state agents and informers. Michael Maguire states 
categorically the ‘origins’ of the 1987 arms shipment lay in Nelson’s 1985 visit 
to South Africa, organised ‘with security force oversight’ by a ‘senior member 
of the UDA who provided information for the RUC’s Special Branch’.xx 
Throughout the next two years the RUC had a wealth of intelligence of a 
‘conspiracy’ of various loyalist paramilitary groups, including the UDA, 
organising to acquire weapons from South Africa.xxi Alongside the UDA this 
involved leading figures in the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the recently 
formed mass-based paramilitary group Ulster Resistance (UR). Contra de Silva’s 
conclusions state agencies were therefore ‘aware of the plans of the UVF, UDA 
and Ulster Resistance to import a significant consignment of weaponry’.xxii 
Among those centrally involved was a senior loyalist RUC informant.xxiii Leading 
UDA figures, many who worked closely with Brian Nelson, directed plans 
throughout. A bank robbery which funded the arms deal was ‘carried out by 
and on behalf of the UDA’ in the months after Nelson became Chief of 
intelligence for the organisation.xxiv Alongside their ‘command and control’ of 
loyalist paramilitary groups and their part in ‘murder [and] conspiracy to 
murder’, Dr Maguire concluded, state ‘informants [were] involved in the 
procurement and distribution of the weapons, including individuals at the most 
senior levels of the organisation(s) responsible for the importation’.xxv RUC 
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Special Branch was aware months prior to the arms smuggling that proceeds 
from the robbery were to be used ‘to finance a large arms deal exploiting a 
South African connection’ and were ‘monitoring’ the situation alongside ‘the 
Security Service’. Even if the official line was taken at face value, it surely 
beggars belief that at no point did any of the intelligence agencies at least ask 
Nelson, Head of UDA Intelligence, to try and find out what was going on? 
 
Arms Seizures and Police ‘Failures’ 
Within weeks of the arms shipment around a third had been captured by the 
RUC. As noted, for de Silva this is proof positive that loyalists were not simply 
acting as ‘state-sponsored forces’. Again, the picture that emerges from the 
Loughinisland report reveals a darker story. Certainly on 8 January 1988 a 
specialist unit of the RUC stopped three cars at a road checkpoint near the 
large RUC/Army base just outside Portadown, Co. Armagh. Two were found to 
be heavily laden with weapons and all three drivers, led by the UDA 
commander in North Belfast, were arrested and subsequently jailed.xxvi This 
was an intelligence-led operation run by the Tactical Co-ordinating Group 
(TCG) for the area. The TCG brought together senior members of RUC Special 
Branch and British intelligence and specialist units (including the SAS) to 
conduct covert operations. At that time TCG (South) was led by Ian Phoenix, a 
senior figure in RUC Special Branch long experienced in organising and running 
its counterinsurgency efforts.xxvii A former member of the British parachute 
regiment, his military background made Phoenix peculiarly well-placed to co-
ordinate police and military counterinsurgency operations.xxviii He also became 
a keen advocate of a ‘more aggressive’ counterinsurgency campaign and the 
deployment of the SAS in actions against the IRA.xxix When the SAS killed eight 
IRA Volunteers in the Loughgall ambush in 1987 Phoenix led the RUC support 
operations. Shortly after, in late 1987, he took up his TCG role co-ordinating 
covert operations throughout Armagh and Tyrone.xxx For Phoenix this was also 
home ground, born and raised in a small village in east Tyrone a few miles 
away from both Loughgall and where the weapons haul was captured.xxxi The 
precise actions of TCG in the search for weapons are shrouded in some 
mystery as the relevant records are lost, likely destroyed.xxxii 
What we do know is that a substantial surveillance operation had been 
in place for some time. Both E4A (a counterinsurgency unit of the RUC) and the 
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British army were involved in tracking leading loyalists as they met to organise 
the distribution of the arms shipment. The RUC had those involved in moving 
the weapons under close surveillance and seem to have had a good idea the 
cache of imported weapons were being stored in and around the small Co. 
Armagh village of Tandragee.xxxiii Indeed, on the morning of their arrest, the 
three drivers were followed to Tandragee, where they were met and escorted 
to the weapons hide. At that point, however, the RUC surveillance appears to 
have been ‘temporarily unsighted’. Only afterwards did the E4A unit pick up 
again the now weapons laden cars. The exact location of the weapons dump 
apparently therefore remained a mystery. However, it was in any case clear 
the weapons had been stored close by. Special Branch intelligence also 
indicated the arms seized were only a portion of the total. Despite this, not 
until four days later did the CID detectives investigating find out the weapons 
had been kept at a farm between Tandragee and the nearby village of 
Markethill; home to another of the loyalists under surveillance. Even then, 
although CID carried out searches in the area one notable location was left 
untouched. It was a farm with a particularly dark and violent place in the story 
of collusion belonging to local man James Mitchell.  
 
Mitchells Farm and the ‘Glennane Gang’ 
While CID detectives said they would have ‘torn apart’ Mitchell’s farm had they 
been aware of its past, that history could not have been entirely unknown to 
those involved in the world of intelligence and counterinsurgency.xxxiv Mitchell 
had been convicted for ‘keeping a major UVF arms dump’ on his farm 
before.xxxv Indeed so central had Mitchell been in the violent sectarian 
campaign of the notorious loyalist ‘Glennane Gang’, it would be named after 
his farm. For a period of over five years in the mid-1970’s, in the heart of what 
became known as the ‘murder triangle’, Mitchell’s farmhouse ‘served as a kind 
of engine room for murder and mayhem in mid-Ulster’.xxxvi The Glennane Gang 
were responsible for some of the most infamous and costly loyalist killings. 
These included the Miami Showband Massacre in 1975 and the Dublin-
Monaghan bombings in 1974 in which 33 people were killed; the greatest loss 
of life on a single day throughout the conflict.xxxvii ‘It is likely’, stated the 2003 
Barron Report into the Dublin-Monaghan bombings, ‘that the farm of James 
Mitchell played a significant part in the preparation of the attacks’.xxxviii It was 
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here the bombings were planned, the bombs used stored and where several of 
the bombers left to carry out the atrocity.  
The Glennane Gang has also become a byword for collusion. Mitchell 
himself was a former RUC Reserve Officer. Indeed, even after his arrest on 
arms charges he continued to serve in that role for almost a year before 
resigning. Several others were either serving or former members of the RUC 
and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), a locally recruited regiment of the 
British Army with an appalling record of collusion with loyalists.xxxix To all 
intents and purposes the illegal UVF paramilitary unit operating in this area at 
that time was all but indistinguishable from the security forces. It was at 
Mitchell’s farm ‘this group of loyalists, UDR men and RUC officers met, drilled 
and conspired in the 1970s on a regular basis’.xl Foreshadowing the attack in 
Loughinisland years later this involved organising mass killings in bars in 
neighbouring nationalist towns and villages.xli British state military and political 
officials were also aware of these activities. By early 1976 they knew the farm 
had been used as a ‘staging post’ for the Dublin-Monaghan bombings and 
placed it under surveillance’.xlii  
Yet this did not stop the Glennane Gang’s ferocious campaign targeting 
and killing Catholics in their homes; the ‘killers were still free to strike’. Nor did 
it end attacks on bars. The bombing of the Step Inn, Keady in August 1976 is a 
case in point and presents a chilling comparison to the pattern of events so 
many years later. Having received warning of a planned explosion Mitchell’s 
farm had been placed under surveillance, but with ‘gaping holes during the 
hours of darkness’ when the surveillance was withdrawn.xliii Mitchell had 
already been warned the farm was being watched; by a UDR captain who 
supplied the explosives for the attack. Despite knowing the farm had been 
under suspicion the bombers (including several members of the security 
forces) carried out the attack within hours of the surveillance being lifted, 
apparently unconcerned they would be stopped or arrested. The massive car 
bomb placed outside the Step Inn killed two people and seriously injured 22 
others. Although RUC Special Branch had considerable evidence, both before 
and after the bombing, of who planned and carried out the attack this 
information was withheld from CID investigators and no search was made of 
Mitchell’s farm. In 2006 Justice Barron concluded even though state 
authorities in the North knew Mitchell’s farm had been a ‘centre for illegal 
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activities’ since the start of 1976 ‘and probably for some time before that… 
those activities were allowed to continue for another two years’.xliv While 
senior security forces officers permitted a ‘climate to develop in which loyalist 
subversives could believe they could attack with impunity’. 
In all the Glennane Gang has been implicated in almost 90 killings of 
Catholics and nationalists in this period.xlv Its activities were only brought to a 
halt in 1978 after one of its members, John Weir, was arrested for murder and 
confessed, naming others involved. At the time Weir was also a serving 
member of the local RUC Special Patrol Group, a counterinsurgency unit he 
later said ‘‘saw itself as being at war with the IRA and regarded loyalist 
paramilitaries as allies’.xlvi The arrest and conviction of James Mitchell for 
harbouring weapons and explosives followed soon after.  Although, strikingly, 
he only received a one year suspended sentence, a derisory decision mirrored 
by those for others in the gang who were also members of the security 
forces.xlvii In one judgement Lord Chief Justice Lowry (the most senior legal 
figure in the North) argued, perversely, that as police officers, charged with the 
duty to maintain justice, even if guilty of serious, violent crime, any sentence 
‘would be imposed on a different and lower scale from that appropriate to 
terrorists’. Collusion, it has been suggested, was not something from which the 
legal process was wholly immune. 
Among those also named by Weir was Robin ‘The Jackal’ Jackson, said to 
have had a leading role in the Miami Showband massacre and one of the 
bombers believed to have set off from Mitchell’s farm to carry out the attacks 
in Dublin and Monaghan.xlviii A former member of the UDR Jackson is believed 
to have been responsible for many other loyalist killings and atrocities 
committed in the Mid-Ulster area over decades. Indeed, alleged to be 
responsible for more deaths than virtually anyone else involved in the conflict. 
Despite this, he spent remarkably little time in jail. Justice Barron concluded 
Jackson was ‘reliably said to have relationships with British Intelligence and/or 
RUC Special Branch’.xlix In other words, Robin Jackson was either a police 
informer or British army agent, perhaps both. It has been claimed he had very 
close links to British military intelligence, as allegedly did several other 
members of the Glennane Gang.l  In 1988, at the time the UVF collaborated 
with Ulster Resistance and the UDA to import weapons into the North and 
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store them in the Armagh countryside, Robin Jackson was the UVF’s Mid-Ulster 
commander. 
 
Turning a Blind Eye 
Despite this violent history, when the RUC knew a large cache of weapons had 
been hidden in the Tandragee-Markethill area in 1988 it seems no-one thought 
to search James Mitchell’s farm. This despite the fact one of the senior RUC 
officers ‘on the ground’ during the ‘loss of surveillance at a crucial time’ and 
the search for the weapons had been involved in questioning Mitchell in the 
1970s. Yet at no point did he propose searching Mitchell’s farm. Something for 
which (a clearly incredulous) Michael Maguire concluded there is ‘no logical 
explanation’.li Indeed, despite Mitchell’s record of involvement with the 
Glennane Gang, his earlier conviction, alleged involvement in storing UVF 
weapons in the early 1980s and that ‘within a week’ of the Mahon Road 
arrests the RUC knew he attended a meeting with several other leading 
loyalists ‘to discuss the arms seizure’, the police never even questioned 
Mitchell about the 1987 imported arms.lii Michael Maguire is in little doubt 
Mitchell’s farm was where the arms were kept.liii Later intelligence indicated as 
much. It also suggested within hours of the 8 January arrests Mitchell had been 
tipped off by a member of the RUC that his farm might be searched and the 
remaining stock of weapons was moved soon after.liv The same source 
indicated a portion of the weapons from Mitchell’s farm, including the type of 
automatic weapon used at Loughinisland, found its way into the hands of 
Robin Jackson. Contrary to other accounts, a further police seizure of some 
imported weapons in Belfast a month later was not the result of on-going 
searches or intelligence passed on by Special Branch.lv In sum, Special Branch 
withholding of intelligence and the failure to consider searching Mitchell’s 
farm ‘permitted the prompt undetected removal of the remaining weapons’ 
and so allowed their later use in dozens of killings, including those at 
Loughinisland.lvi Given the ‘gravity of the conspiracy’, the decision not to 
investigate leading loyalists implicated in the importation of the weapons, 
several of them informants, was ‘indefensible’. The imported arms would 
subsequently be used in at least 70 loyalist killings, likely more.lvii  
These events should not be viewed in isolation. Rather they are 
indicative of a wider pattern of ‘see no evil collusion’. While on the one hand 
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the leaking of state intelligence to loyalists was taking place on an industrial 
scale, paradoxically, Special Branch (the ‘force within a force’) withheld 
intelligence from criminal inquiries in order to ‘protect’ their agents and 
informers.lviii The latter (often marked on files) was known as ‘No Downward 
Dissemination’ (NDD), or ‘slow waltz’ in Special Branch parlance.lix This was a 
matter of policy, one of the wholesale changes introduced in the North in the 
early 1980s by a later Head of MI5, as the primacy of counterinsurgency 
subverted other aspects of policing.lx These measures centralised intelligence 
and ensured Special Branch was given over-riding control of the handling of 
agents and informers. In the drive to recruit and protect paramilitary 
informants criminal investigations were fundamentally manipulated, 
undermined or prevented. Senior police, military and political figures were 
aware this meant those working on behalf of the state were often involved in 
serious crime, up to and including murder. Yet no rules were introduced to 
prevent that happening. This was not a failure of policy but its point.lxi It was 
the space in which a culture of collusion could flourish. 
That same pattern was all too evident in the lead up to and aftermath of 
the attack at Loughinisland itself, as ‘the desire to protect informants’ 
impacted on ‘policing activity’ and ‘undermined the police investigation’.lxii 
These events should not therefore be understood as the result of individual 
police failings or prejudice, whatever role both may have played. An 
‘intelligence mind-set’ rather than ‘intelligence failures’ deferred or stopped 
criminal investigation and ‘at worst’ demonstrated a ‘disregard for the 
suffering of the families involved at the hands of loyalist paramilitary gangs’.lxiii 
This was rooted in the orientation of military and police counterinsurgency 
thinking, the institutional character of the bodies involved, and the social 
milieu in which both were operating. While state public rhetoric argued it 
adopted an even-handed approach to the prevention of ‘terrorism’, the 
overwhelming focus of its concern was the IRA and Irish republicanism. So, 
evidence of an increasingly active UVF unit operating in the Co. Down area in 
which Loughinisland is found, was all but ignored by the local RUC, whose 
attention remained ‘almost entirely’ fixed on the IRA.lxiv As a direct result the 
nationalist community faced a ‘heightened risk’ of attack.lxv Republicanism was 
the enemy, loyalism, at the very least, far less so.  
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Worse, both the RUC and the UDR in the area had been ‘compromised’ 
through either ‘direct involvement with loyalist paramilitaries, associations or 
sympathies’.lxvi This reflects a symbiotic relationship between local state forces 
and loyalism. At least three members of the UVF unit involved in the 
Loughinisland massacre were members of the UDR. Another, identified years 
earlier as an ‘active loyalist terrorist’ and the ‘main organised and planner’ of 
attacks, was a former member of the UDR. When still a member he had 
provided UDR files and photo montages to loyalists and suspected of 
involvement in earlier attacks. Even after this came to light (in an echo of the 
treatment of James Mitchell over a decade earlier) he continued to serve in the 
UDR for several months and ‘to attend RUC/UDR briefings’ before resigning.lxvii 
Such things were not unknown to the RUC or its senior officers. Several local 
UVF members were identified as having ‘connections to the security forces’ on 
the eve of the Loughinisland attack.lxviii This included having ‘close family 
members’ working within the RUC. In that context it is perhaps little surprise 
these ‘corrupt’ relations led to a ‘leak’ by a police officer of the imminent 
arrest of members of the South Down UVF in the wake of the Loughinisland 
killings. Or that (following an ‘inexcusable’ decision) the leak was never even 
investigated.lxix Alongside the desire to protect informers, including some of 
those suspected of being directly involved at Loughinisland who continued to 
be employed by Special Branch afterwards, this was a social milieu that made 
collusion an endemic feature of policing. 
 
The Tight Gag of Placelxx 
Again, such circumstances should not therefore be viewed in isolation. 
Institutionalised collusion was the result of a confluence of forces. In part, it 
was the product of the long term character of state counterinsurgency thought 
and practice, driven less by a doctrine of ‘minimum force’ than of ‘necessity’.lxxi 
It was also the means by which an intelligence-led attritional strategy was 
realised, generating a grey zone of official deniability around the criminal, 
murderous actions of state agents and informers.lxxii However, none of this can 
be divorced from the wider social structure, power relations and political order 
that gave it shape. Into that mix should therefore be added the long term 




Most analyses of sectarian division and segregation (and its relationship 
to conflict and violence) have focussed on the major cities of Belfast and 
Derry.lxxiii However, such divisions, deeply rooted in a history of colonial 
conquest, appropriation and settlement, have always been just as stark and 
real in many rural areas of the North, if often less visible to those unfamiliar 
with the signs, signals and local social knowledge of the sectarian habitus.lxxiv 
Nor were they simply the product of thirty years of conflict. A complex of 
segregated social and kinship networks, and the everyday negotiation of 
interactions and distance between religiously-defined communities of 
‘neighbours’ and ‘strangers’ was a feature of life in the pre-conflict rural 
North.lxxv  These separate worlds found institutional expression in the pivotal 
communal role of various churches, social institutions like the Orange Order 
and the Gaelic Athletic Association and local political loyalties fostered to cut 
across divisions of status and class. Nor have such divisions disappeared. 
Despite important changes, for many, a contemporary landscape of spatial, 
social and institutional separation in rural areas is a ‘continuing legacy of the 
troubles.lxxvi   
During the conflict, of course, such divisions were all the more acute and 
relations tense. A study of two villages (one overwhelmingly Catholic the other 
Protestant) in Co. Armagh in the 1990s demonstrated the everyday lack of 
contact and avoidance of people from the other community, the tendency to 
‘stick to your own’ and how this had been accentuated by the ‘devastating 
impact’ of the conflict.lxxvii Indeed these villages were in the very area close to 
James Mitchell’s farm where the Glennane Gang operated, as of course did the 
IRA. Republican attacks, most notably the massacre of 10 Protestant men at 
Kingsmill in 1976, also ‘fuelled sectarian fear’ and insecurity within the unionist 
community and a sense of ‘physical and psychological exposure’. An all-
consuming sense of decline, the collapse of community infrastructure and the 
destruction of social institutions (not least with republican attacks on Orange 
Halls) permeated the life of the Protestant village by the 1990s. However true, 
in other border areas there was a widely held perception republican violence 
was directed at removing the Protestant community from the local 
countryside.lxxviii Given its make-up, the deaths of members of the UDR and 
RUC in these and other areas were often experienced as community losses by 
unionists. And certainly there were many state security victims of republican 
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violence, as well as civilians. In total just over 300 members of the RUC were 
killed as well as 200 UDR soldiers and a further 61 former members of both.lxxix 
Virtually all were killed by republican armed groups. 
This was the context within which a ‘doomsday’ mind-set could catch 
fire in the wake of the signing in 1985 of Anglo-Irish Agreement which, for 
many unionist, represented an existential betrayal. However partial, parallel 
attempts to ‘professionalise’ the RUC also generated tensions in relations 
between the police and unionist communities, often for the first time.lxxx A 
growing sense of sides being chosen fed directly into the rise of Ulster 
Resistance as a mass-based ‘sort of clean-living paramilitary group’ that might 
be ‘deemed respectable and attracted loyalists from the middle classes.lxxxi 
Indeed, the social make-up of loyalist paramilitaries in rural areas (where 
Ulster Resistance found most of its support) often differed from that of their 
urban counterparts. The UVF in the small towns and villages of the countryside 
did not draw its members from working class communities as was primarily 
(sometimes exclusively) the case in larger towns and cities. Rather, they often 
came from the very same milieu of ‘respectable’ rural social groups and classes 
(and family networks) as were the members of the RUC and UDR.  
The potential melding together of the social order of sectarianism and 
the structure of locally recruited state security forces in rural areas could foster 
(what has been termed by veteran Tyrone-based political activist Bernadette 
McAliskey) ‘breakfast table’ collusion.lxxxii Given many loyalists and members of 
the RUC and UDR were ‘drawn from the same population, the same 
communities, the same families’, she contends, RUC officers and UDR soldiers 
‘sit around the table with their brothers in the UDA and UVF. Collusion is born 
around that breakfast table. You have collusion before you get your toast 
eaten’. While Michael Maguire is at pains to point out members of the same 
family may have very different views and cannot simply be found guilty by 
association, at the very least such close familial links between security forces 
and paramilitaries were likely to ‘lead to suspicion in the eyes of others’.lxxxiii 
Certainly these socially embedded networks of family and community, of 
separation and division, could be mobilised in the organisation and conduct of 
campaigns of violence. This was as true of the family trees that branched 
through and bound together the IRA in border areas like East Tyrone and South 
Armagh as it did of the UVF in those self-same places. However, such 
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communally and kinship-based networks were also defined by the broader 
organisation of social and political power and their relationship to the 
institutions of the northern state. After partition (indeed even before) these 
social divisions were replicated and reflected in the political order. For 
unionists it meant localised communal social networks were often interwoven 
and embedded in the structures of unionist hegemony and the apparatus of 
surveillance, control and coercion it put into place. This was most obviously so 
in terms of the coercive arm of the state; the police force. From the foundation 
of the state, the RUC was overwhelmingly drawn from the unionist 
community.lxxxiv Alongside, the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC), or ‘B’ 
Specials, acted as a substantial reserve force and state militia.lxxxv Mobilised in 
times of political crisis the ‘B men’, working in their own localities, utilised local   
knowledge, combined with the (regularly employed) draconian powers 
conferred on the state by the Special Powers Act, as the primary means to 
enforce rule.lxxxvi  
Essentially crafted as a counterinsurgency force and seeing their role as 
‘protecting the state and the unionist community against nationalist 
subversion’ they were deployed to ‘keep the Catholic community under close 
scrutiny’.lxxxvii Nationalist antagonism toward the B Specials was borne out of 
‘harassment and humiliation’ experienced at their hands, accentuated by ‘the 
fact [they] often knew their tormentors by name…as neighbours [who were] 
armed, uniformed, paid and entrusted with special powers’. In contrast to a 
nostalgia-infused and ideologically potent vision of the pre-conflict Northern 
Irish countryside as a place of peace and tranquillity, this was rather a long 
term condition of ‘imposed normality’.lxxxviii A situation more akin to that of 
other colonial police forces, for many of whom the RUC and USC became a 
model; something often celebrated by the RUC themselves.lxxxix Indeed there is 
considerable continuity here with the development of the ‘global brand’ of the 
RUC as a model for ‘post-conflict’ policing in, for example, Iraq.xc 
Discredited and disbanded after the outbreak of the conflict in 1970, the 
‘B men’ were immediately replaced by the UDR, as a regiment within the 
British Army, which soon developed its own litany of abuse, illegality and 
collusion.xci Locally recruited like its predecessor, the UDR operated much like a 
militia in its own locality. Deploying local knowledge in a divided society was 
central to its function. Indeed initially many of its members (in some areas all 
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its local commanders) were former B Specials.xcii  Extensive, chronic collusion 
between the UDR and loyalist paramilitaries was both soon evident and long 
known. A report by the moderate nationalist SDLP in the early 1980s noted not 
only the UDR had ‘by far the worst record for serious sectarian crimes’ of any 
British military force but was ‘known to have been seriously infiltrated’ by 
loyalist groups.xciii As a result, far from being upholders of ‘law and order’ it 
was seen ‘more as a menace’ by nationalists.  
As the case of the Glennane Gang amply illustrates, many former and 
serving UDR members certainly found their way into the ranks of the loyalist 
paramilitary groups. They were far from unique. Nor was the extensive 
involvement of UDR members in loyalist paramilitary organisations any secret 
to the authorities from the earliest years of the conflict onwards.xciv Indeed the 
UDR has been likened to both a pseudo-gang and an eighteenth century 
yeomanry part of whose function was to control ‘the worst excesses of loyalist 
sectarianism by placing loyalists in uniform under the command of English 
officers and contain unrest by tactics of intimidation and harassment’.xcv In 
other words, the UDR provided an official, locally-based conduit for grassroots 
loyalism and, through two decades, ‘operated a system of low-level state 
terror that was tolerated by the authorities because it fitted the overall goals 
of the security apparatus’. As well as direct involvement in bombings and 
killings, in the late 1980s and early 1990s members of the UDR were central in 
the wholesale leaking of intelligence files and photos of suspected republicans 
to loyalist groups.xcvi ‘Lost’ or ‘stolen’ UDR weapons had a tendency to turn up 
in loyalist hands. At that point the ranks of the ‘respectable’ paramilitary Ulster 
Clubs and Ulster Resistance included many UDR men. And, of course, both 
former and serving UDR members were centrally involved in efforts to import 
an arsenal capable of re-arming loyalism as, beset by a ‘doomsday mind-set’ in 
an onslaught against the ‘pan-nationalist front’, it prepared to launch a new 
wave of killings, such as those at Loughinisland.xcvii 
 
Truth and Loughinisland  
In his report the police ombudsman records a catalogue of catastrophic ways 
in which the police investigation into the Loughinisland massacre was 
fundamentally undermined.xcviii Key was the failure to arrest or question 
several men (suspected of involvement within hours of the attack) until weeks, 
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months, sometimes even years later.xcix The former member of the UDR 
previously reported as a key planner and organiser of the UVF in South Down 
was identified as a suspect within a day of the massacre taking placing. Yet he 
was not arrested for questioning until over two month later, something for 
which Dr Maguire could find no rationale.c Within days of the attack the 
getaway car was found abandoned close to this loyalist’s home and that of 
another key suspect. While other houses in the area were ‘visited’, 
inexplicably, theirs were not; evidence of ‘a reluctance by police to conduct 
enquiries in the areas of the suspects’ addresses’.ci And so it goes on. Such 
delays ensured any opportunities to bring to justice the culprits responsible for 
the Loughinisland attack were lost. Up to the present, no-one has ever been 
charged or convicted for direct involvement in the Loughinisland killings.  Their 
connections to the security forces likely afforded protection to some. Likewise 
for those among the killers who were police informers. Despite their supposed 
role in aiding the police in preventing such violence, senior loyalist ‘sources’ 
were not pressed to find out what they could about the killings, apparently in 
case they implicated themselves in wrong-doing.cii Nor did suspected 
involvement in the gunning down of six innocent men seemingly bar someone 
from working on behalf of the state afterward. One ‘legitimate suspect’ 
continued to act as an RUC informer for many years to come. 
Yet the profound insights into state security practices to emerge from 
the case of Loughinisland do not end there. Time and again the capacity to 
conduct a full inquiry into what happened was hampered, if not fundamentally 
undermined by police records having been destroyed and the unwillingness of 
former members of the RUC, as state servants, to co-operate with the 
investigation.ciii This too was a pattern evident in earlier efforts to get to the 
truth about the way in which the police and military had run a 
counterinsurgency campaign centred on the use of agents and informers.civ All 
of which was only compounded by the utter failure of an earlier Ombudsman 
to do little other than copper-fasten the cover-up of collusion. This formed 
part of a wider struggle over how to deal with the past and to get to the truth 
about official wrong-doing.cv In that battle, only months before the publication 
of the Loughinisland report, the current Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
Theresa Villiers tied her colours firmly to the mast. In a speech on the ‘way 
forward for the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland’ Villiers noted state 
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forces ‘sometimes fell drastically short’ of expected standards but denounced 
what she called the ‘pernicious counter-narrative’ that sought to ‘place the 
state at the heart of nearly every atrocity… through allegations of collusion 
[and the] misuse of agents and informers’.cvi Every accusation of state wrong-
doing, she argued, ‘is treated as fact, however unsubstantiated’. Indeed, 
worryingly, she suggested those highlighting state crime and abuse could give 
‘spurious legitimacy to the terrorist violence of the present’. This prompted a 
number of NGOs to condemn this potentially dangerous ‘demonization of 
human rights defenders’ and victims’ families.cvii Praising the ‘dedication, 
professionalism and courage’ of the police and armed forces, concluded 
Villiers, ‘remember this… it wasn’t the RUC or the Army who… pulled the 
triggers at Loughinisland or Greysteel’.  
When a literal (‘nothing happened’) version of official denial of state 
crime fails, argued Stan Cohen, ‘the strategy may switch to legalistic 
reinterpretations or political justifications’.cviii Often the result is ‘interpretive 
denial’ where the ‘raw facts… are not denied [but] given a different meaning 
from what seems apparent to others’.cix The raw facts of collusion in the 
Loughinisland massacre are now out in the open. Among those who pulled the 
triggers in O’Toole’s bar and shot dead six men were former and serving 
members of the British Army and current RUC informers, using guns imported 
by other agents and informers. Police colluded with those who pulled the 
trigger to ensure they would not go to jail, and the guns had been protected 
from discovery when held by some of the most notorious killers in the history 
of the conflict. ‘When the police turn a “blind eye” to criminality for the 
“greater good”, Michael Maguire argued, ‘it can lead to a corruption of the 
criminal justice process’.cx The Loughinisland families still await an apology 
from Theresa Villiers and the government. 
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